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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
AUTOMOBILES - UNSATISFIED JUDGMENT FUND - AMOUNT
RECEIVED UNDER UNINSURED MOTORIST CLAUSE OF INSURANCE
CONTRACT NOT DEDUCTABLE FROM AMOUNT OWED UNDER UN-
SATISFIED JUDGMENT FUND-Appellant obtained a judgment
for bodily injury resulting from an automobile accident while
riding as a guest in her brother's automobile. She received
compensation in the amount of her judgment under an unin-
sured motorist clause in her brother's automobile insurance
policy. She released the insurer and the insurer in turn waived
its right of subrogation.1 Upon making application for com-
pensation from the unsatisfied judgment fund, the District
Court deducted the amount received under the insurance con-
tract from the amount payable from the fund. On appeal, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that the payment made to
the appellant as an insured under the insurance policy was not
a "collection of a part of her judgment," as contemplated by
statute and hence could not be deducted from the amount pay-
able on the judgment. Pearson v. State Unsatisfied Judgment
Fund, 114 N.W.2d 257 (N.D. 1962).
In North Dakota the only limitation on persons qualified to
recover from the fund is that they be "residents" of North Da-
kota.2 There are no express provisions for amounts deductible
from any judgment recoverable from the fund except for the
clause allowing for a deduction where the judgment creditor
has collected "a part of his judgment from any source."'3 In the
instant case, the Supreme Court construed the insurance pay-
ment as arising from a private contractual relationship which
in no way resulted in the discharge of the rights and obliga-
tions of the judgment. The insurer had no obligation to either
the judgment debtor or to the unsatisfied judgment fund.
Thus, the amount paid to the appellant was compensation for
her loss but technically not payment of her judgment from any
source contemplated by statute.
Unsatisfied judgment funds originated by statutes to pro-
tect people injured by financially irresponsible or unknown
owners and operators of motor vehicles. 4 Their purpose is to
1. It should be noted that if the insurer hadn't waived subrogation
the appellant could not have collected from the fund. This is because she
would have had no judgment to assign to the fund which is required by
statute. N.D. Cent. Code § 39-17-08.
2. N.D. Cent. Code § 39-17-03.
3. N.D. Cent. Code § 39-17-07.
4. See, e.g., Allied American Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles, 219 Md. 607, 150 A.2d 421 (1959).
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compensate losses suffered from the negligent operation of
motor vehicles by uninsured motorists.: The persons entitled
to recover from the fund and the amount recoverable from the
fund are subject to limitations and deductions which vary by
statute in each of the four jurisdictions which have adopted
some form of this plan.6
New Jersey statutes are more restrictive than North Da-
kota's and provide limitations on the persons qualified to col-
lect from the fund.7 Up until 1958, the New Jersey Statute
provided deductions for "indemnities or other benefits receiv-
ed from any other pergon other than the judgment debtor." s
This provision was construed by the courts to include: com-
pensation received from various types of insurance policies; 9
wages paid gratuitously to an employee while he was laid up
unable to work because of injuries sustained in an automobile
accident;" sums recovered in settlement from a co-defend-
ant. 1 After 1958 this provision for deductions was amended
by substituting the words "payments upon the judgment, or
by way of settlement" for the words "indemnities or other
benefits," which makes their statute similar to North Da-
kota's."1
New York established a unique plan combining compulsory
uninsured motorist insurance and a fund for unsatisfied claims
and judgments. 1 Persons classified as an "insured" under the
5. See, e.g., Robson v. Rodriguez, 26 N.J. 517, 141 A.2d 1 (1958).
6. Maryland, Md. Ann. Code Art. 66h §§ 150-179 (1957) (Maryland
Statute similar to New Jersey but no cases in point reported); New Jersey,
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 39:6-61 to -91 (1961); New York (combined plan), N.Y.
Insurance Law §§ 167 (2-a),. 183 (1) (f), 600-626, N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 318 (11); North Dakota, Chapter 39-17, N.D. Cent. Code. See Ward,
The Uninsured Motorist, 9 Buffalo L. Rev. 283 at 285 (1960) for a detailed
comparison of the four jurisdictions having adopted some form of unsat-
isfied judgment fund.
7. N.J. Stat. Ann. 39:6-70 (1961). The fund does not extend to a person
entitled to workmen's compensation; or to a spouse, parent or child, of
the judgment debtor; or a guest occupant in the automobile; or to a per-
son who was operating or riding In an uninsured automobile owned by
him, spouse, parent or child; or was operating a motor vehicle in viola-
tion of suspension or revocation.
8. N.J. Stat. Ann. 39:6-70 (m) (1952).
9. Dixon v. Gassert, 29 N.J. 1, 138 A.2d 14 (1958) (accident and health
policy, medical policy, and "blue cross" policy furnished and paid for
by employer); Holmberg v. Aten, 66 l .J. 73, 171 A.2d 667 (1960) (medical
clause of automobile liability policy and hospitalization policy furnished
and paid for by husband); Minardi v. Dupant, 49 N.J. Super. 139, 139 A.2d
452 (1958) and Fesano v. Gassert, 49 N.J. Super. 52, 138 A.2d 752 (1958)
(temporary disability, hospitalization, and medical and surgical payments).
10. Unger v. Kemmerer, 59 N.J. Super. 262, 156 A.2d 52 (1959).
11. Gray v. Tice, 52 N.J. Super. 309, 145 A.2d 353 (1958).
12. N.J. Stat. Ann. 39:6-70 (m) (1961). As of the present time there
have been no cases under this new provision.
13. Statutes cited supra, note 6. See generally 79 A.L.R.2d 1255, and
Ward, The Uninsured Motorist, 9 Buffalo L. Rev. 283 at 290 (1960).
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statute 14 are denied relief from the unsatisfied claim and judg-
ment fund and only those who can be classified as "qualified"
persons are allowed relief under the fund. 15 The deduction pro-
visions of the statute are similar to North Dakota in that they
allow deductions for the amounts paid in the satisfaction of
the judgment, but they go further in that they allow deduc-
tions specifically for any amount of liability insurance afford-
ed to the claimant.
16
An unsatisfied judgment fund should be used only for the
benefit of those who have no other means of being compensat-
ed for their personal injuries. Uninsured motorist insurance
was created by insurance companies just for this purpose. The
logical question that follows is whether an unsatisfied judg-
ment fund should pay a judgment creditor after he has al-
ready been compensated by an insurance company? It is sub-
mitted that North Dakota's deduction provision is good, but
the limitations determining those persons qualified to recover
under the fund should be extended to overcome this problem
of double compensation. The other three jurisdictions have
done this successfully and without apparent difficulty.
PHILIP J. TEIGEN
CRIMINAL LAW-CORAM NOBIS-AVAILABILITY FOR REVIEW
OF ERROR APPEARING ON RECORD--In 1943 the defendant was
indicted and placed on trial for the crime of murder in the first
degree. The original plea of not guilty was changed to guilty
of murder in the second degree after a conference attended by
the court in which the defendant was examined by four psy-
chiatrists. One of these physicians expressed the opinion that
the boy was not sane at the time of the alleged killing but was
suffering a "psycho motor epileptic attack." The other three
disputed the existence of epilepsy and agreed that the defend-
ant was legally sane. Prison records showed a history of ep-
ileptic seizures. The asserted basis for relief was an allegation
14. N*.Y. Insurance Law § 601 (1) (1961). "The 'insured,' a person de-
fined as an insured under any policy of insurance issued by any member
in connection with motor vehicles containing the provision required by
(§ 167)." (§ 167 provides for liability insurance conditions).
15. N.Y. Insurance Law § 601 (b) (1961). "A 'qualified person,' means
(1) a resident of this state, other than the insured or the owner of an
insured motor vehicle and his spouse when a passenger in such a vehicle
* or (2) a resident of another state . .. in which recourse is afforded to
the residents of this state .
16. N.Y. Insurance Law § 610 (1961).
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